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position and the obligations resting upon me will make its fallacy
and unsoundness sufficiently apparent. The act referred to, whatever views may be entertained of its necessity or expediency, is a
valid and constitutional law, and as 'uch must be respected and
enforced. No judge or other oflicer of the State or national government, or any citizen of either, so far as the rights of others are
concerned, has a right to act on his private and individual views of
the policy and validity of laws passed in conformity with the forms
of the Constitution. Until repealed or set aside by the adjudication of the proper judicial tribunal, they must have the force of laws,
and be obeyed as such. Any other principle must lead to anarchy
in its worst form, and result inevitably in the speedy overthrow of
our institutions.
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Supreme Court of Ohio, December Term, 1855.
T17e City of Cincinnati vs. Leverett G. Stone and Medad W. Stone.
In error. Reserved in the District Court of Hamilton county. Opinion
of the court by
BAnTLEY, J.-The city of Cincinnati having given a contract to a person to regrade and repave a street, providing in the contract for " the
work to be done under the direction of the City Civil Engineer, or Agent
appointed by the City Council for the same, who shall have entire control
over the manner of doing and shaping all, or any part of the same, and
whose directions must be strictly obeyed," &c.; the contractor carelessly
and improperly left piles of stones and materials for the work at a place
near or about the gutter of the street, where a nuisance was likely to be
created, whereby at the time of a rain, the water being obstructed, flowed
back and over the pavement on the premises and building of the defendants in error, doing the damage complained of, Held1. That the liability of one person for damages arising from the negligence or misfeasance of another, on the principle of respondeat superior,
is confined in its application to the relation of master and servant, or
principal and agent, and does not extend to cases of independent contracts
not creating the relation of principal and agent, and where the employer
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does not retain the control over the mode and manner of the performance
of the work under the contract.
2. But where the employer retains the control and direction over the
mode and manner of doing the work, and an injury results from the negligence or misconduct of the contractor, or his servant or agent, the employer is placed under a liability equal and similar to that which exists in
the ordinary casc of principal and agent.
3. In addition to the fact, in this case, that the city of Cincinnati
retained the entire control and direction over the work, under the contract, it was a public duty enjoined upon the city to remove all nuisances
from the streets of the city, and to make no contract for the improvement
of the streets, by which any nuisance would be created on the premises
of the adjacent proprietors, the city was, therefore, clearly liable for the
injury sustained by the negligence of the contractor, or of any of his subordinates in the performance of the work.
.Elias Straus & Brother vs. The Eagle Insurance Company of Cncinnati. Assumpsit, Reserved in the District Court of Ross county.
The opinion of the Court by
RANNEY, J,.-L Corporations have such powers, and such only, as the

act creating them confers; and are confined to the exercise of those expressly granted, and such incidental powers as are necessary for the purpose of carrying into effect powers specifically conferred.
2. The act of incorporation, like any other statute, should be construed
in such manner as will best answer the intention of the legislature; and
all its parts should, if possible be made subservient to, and in harmony
with, the leading purposes and objects intended to be accomplished, and
for which the corporation is created.
3. Unless expressly restrained by its charter, a corporation has the incidental power to make any contract, and evidence it by any instrument,
that may be necessary and proper, to accomplish such purposes and objects.
4. A note or bill made or received by such a corporation, is, prima
facie, within its corporate powers, and, therefore, valid; but it is competent to show, that it was given or taken for a purpose not authorized, and
when shown, the contract is void, and the instrument a nullity.
5. An insurance company, authorized by its charter to invest its funds
and capital stock, as should be deemed best by the directors, for the safety
of the capital and interest of the stockholders, has no power to purchase
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upon credit, the promissory note of one insured by the company, and entitled to indemnity for a loss, for the purpose of setting off such note
against the claim.
6. The power of investment was designed to enable the company to
make a profitable use of its surplus funds; but such a contract, involving
the use of no such funds, is, not only, without the limits of the charter,
but directly opposed to its leading objects; as it furnishes a strong inducement to withhold prompt payment, for the purpose of depressing the
credit of the insured, thereby enabling the company to purchase his paper
at a greater discount.
7. The company, therefore, has no power to become a party to the contract of endorsement, and no capacity to receive or hold the legal title to
the note.
8. A set-off can only be allowed for such claims as in good faith
absolutely belonged to the party at the commencement of the action ; and
does not extend to claims purchased conditionally fdr the purpose of using
them as a set-off, and with an agreement to return them to the seller, if
they are not so used.
Set-off disallowed, and judgment for plaintiff.
The Atlantic and Great Western Railroad Company vs. Francis

Campbell.-Petitionin error to reverse a judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Marrion county. The opinion of the court by
KENNON, J.-st.
That in a proceeding to appropriate the land of a
person for the use of a railroad company, the owner of the land proposed
to be appropriated, is a competent witness to testify in his own behalf,
provided the proceedings have been instituted since the code took effect.

2d. That as a general rule the opinion of a witness as to the amount of
damages which the landholder will sustain by reason of the construction
au use of a railroad, is not evidence.
The verdict of the jury is set aside and the judgment of the Court of
Common Pleas reversed.
Follett, Adm'rfor the use, &c., vs. Buyer.

Error to the District Court

of Erie county. The opinion of the court by
THURMAN, C. J.-That in an action upon a note brought by the payee,
for the use of his assignee, against the maker-the note having been assigned, (but not endorsed,) after due-and it not appearing that the payee
was insolvent when he made the assignment, the maker cannot set off
money paid by him as surety for the payee, after he received notice of the
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assignment, although the money paid was upon a liability entered into
before the assignment, but which had not been reduced into judgment
against the surety before notice of the assignment was given. The maker
had no demand upon the payee when he received such notice, but was
only contingently liable for him.
Judgment of District Court reversed and that of Common Pleas
affirmed.
Ford vs. Parker.-Petition in error to reverse the judgment of the
District Court of Hancock county. The opinion of the court by
KENox, J.-1, That the 10th section of the act regulating the jurisdiction: of Justices of th: Peace, which provides "That justices shall not
have cognizance in actions against Justices of the Peace or othler officers
for misconduct in office," includes postmasters.
2. That when an action is brought against a postmaster for misconduct
in office, and the damages claimed are less than $100, such action may be
commenced in the Court of Common Pleas.
3. That in such action, when the petition charges that a letter containing money was lost by the negligence of the postmaster, and the evidence infroduced on the trial tended to prove that the letter containing the money
reached the office of the postmaster, the plaintiff may prove, for the purpose of establishing the negligence, that the office was kept in an exposed
situation, and that the servants and clerks of the postmaster, in a store in
,which the post office was kept by the postmaster, had free access to the
mail matter in the office.
Judgment of the District Court reversed.
27te Board of Education of Brown township, .airfield county, and
others, vs. John Chaney.- Motion for leave to file a petition in error to
reverse a decree of the District Court of Fairfield county. The opinion
of the court by
KENNo, J.-L That under the 24th section of the act to establish a
fund for the support of Common Schools, which provides that "so much
of the moneys coming from township tax levied for the continuation of
ochools after the State fund has been exhausted, shall be applicable only
to the payment of teachers in the proper township, and shall be drawn
for no other purpose whatever, and all school funds made applicable to
the payment of teachers only, shall be distributed to the several subdistricts and fractional parts of districts in the township, in proportion
to the enuneration of the scholars ;" each sub-district is entitled to such
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distribution, and the funds cannot be applied. in any other proportion for
the purpose of keeping up a school for seven months in each district, notwithstanding the provision of the same act, which provides that the board
shall make the necessary provision for continuing the schools in operation
in their respective townships for at least seven months.
2. That where such board has not sufficient funds to keep up a school
in each sub-district for seven months without using the funds belonging to
other districts, it cannot comply with the requisitions of the statute in
that particular.
Motion for leave to file petition withdrawn.
Justice Martin et. at. vs. Bailey & Buigess.-Reserved in the District
Court of Cuyahoga county, on a motion for a new trial. The opinion of
the court by
BARTLEY, J.-1. That a draft of money payable at a day subsequent
to its date, although otherwise in the ordinary form of a check, is a bill
of exchange and subject to the usages and rules that govern bills of exchange, and as such, is entitled to days of grace.
2. The distinction between a bill and a check does not depend upon
whether drawn payable to order or bearer, or whether drawn upon a bank
or a banker or not, but it is founded in the difference in the nature or
character of these two classes of commercial paper.
S. A check and a bill of exchange, although in many respects similar,
are to be distinguished in the following particulars, to wit:
1st. A check is drawn upon an existing fund, and is an absolute transfer
or appropriation to the holder of so much money in the hands of the
drawee; whereas a bill of exchange is not always or necessarily drawn upon
actual funds in the hands of the drawee, but very frequently drawn in
anticipation of funds, or upon a previously arranged credit.
2d. The drawer of a check is always the principal, whereas the drawer
of a bill frequently stands in the position of a mere surety.
Sd. Although demand of payment and notice of non-payment, in due
time, may be essential to hold the indorser of a check, yet a failure in
this respect does not discharge the drawer, unless an actual loss to him
can be shown to have arisen from such delinquency on the part of the
holder.
4th. A check requires no acceptance, and when presented, is presented
for payment.
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5th. It is not protestable, or, in other words, protest is not requisite to
hold the maker or an endorser.
4. From these distinguishing characteristics arising out of the nature
of these two classes of instruments, it follows, that a check is payable on
presentation and demand, and cannot be made payable on a specified day in
future, and consequently not entitled to days of grace.
5. Any supposed usage of banks in any particular place to regard
drafts upon them payable at a day certain, as checks, and not entitled to
days of grace, is inadmissible as evidence to control the rules of law in relation to such paper.
Motion for a new trial overruled, and judgment for the plaintiff.
Reuben Perkins vs. .Margaret A. .Mobley. Error. Reserved in Belmont county. The opinion of the court by
RANNEY, J.-1. The mother of a bastard child, after the reputed father
has been recognized by a justice of the peace, on a complaint instituted
by her, under the act for the maintenance and support of illegitimate
children, has no power to settle for or release his liability.
2. The liability of the father is created by the statute., and designed for
the security of the public against the support of the child, by compelling
him to make the necessary provision therefor; and can only be settled by
the mother while the complaint is pending before the justice, and upon
giving security to the township in which she resides, against all liability
for such support.
3. It is not competent to inquire of the general reputation of a witness
sought to be impeached; but the inquiry must be confined to the reputation of the witness for truth and veracity.
Judgment affirmed.
David XcConohy vs. The State of Olo.-Writ of error to the Court
of Common Pleas of Muskingum county, to reverse a judgment against
the plaintiff in error, on an indictment for the crime of shooting with intent to kill. The opinion of the court by
B]ARTLEY, J.-1:--.

That, while drunkenness creates no exemption from

criminal responsibility, and may even exaggerate the turpitude of guilt
in some cases, delirium tremens or mania a potu, although the result or

consequence of continued intoxication, is insanity or a diseased state of
the mind, which affects responsibility for crime in the same way as insanity produced from any other cause.
2. The reason that intoxication creates no exemption from criminal
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responsibility, does not apply to delirium tremens, which, although, like
many other kinds of mania, the result of prior vicious indulgence, is
always shunned rather than courted by the patient, and is not voluntarily
assumed, either as a cloak for guilt, or to nerve the perpetrator to the
commission of crime.
Judgment reversed, and cause remanded to the Court of Common
Pleas.
Cutter Cheadle vs. The State of Ohio.-Error to the Probate Court of

Morgan county. The opinion of the court by
RANNEY, J.-1. On the trial of an information for selling spirituous
liquors not inspected, the State is bound to give some evidence in support
of the negative averment.
2. It is error to charge the jury "that the State is not required to
prove that the liquor was not inspected. That on the State's proving a
sale, the defendant is required to prove that the liquor was inspected."
Judgment reversed, and cause remanded for further proceedings.
Judge SwAN dissented.

Woodworth vs. Paige. In Chancery. From Astabula county. The
opinion of the court by
THUMv.AN, 0. J.-If there is no fraudulent turning away from a
knowledge of the facts which the res gestte would suggest to a prudent
mind; if mere want of caution as distinguished from fraudulent and
wilful blindness, is all that can be imputed to the purchaser, then the
doctrine of constructive notice will not apply-then the purchaser will in
equity be considered, as in fact he is, a bona fide purchaser without
notice.
Semble-That a release of dower in a deed executed by husband and
wife, without consideration, to defraud his creditors, will not estop her to
claim dower against the grantee, or any purchaser from him with notice.
No fraud can be imputed to her because of such release, for the reason
that she releases nothing that could be taken by her husband's securities.
Bill dismissed.
Gwin Reed and Taylor vs. Sibley Shuck, and others.-Chancery,

reserved by the District Court of Vinton county. The opinion of the
court by
KENNON, J.-lst. That when a bona fide sale is made of the property
of a firm by its members before any proceedings either in law or equity
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are instituted by a creditor of the firm, such creditor cannot by any subsequent proceeding acquire a lien upon the property thus disposed of.
2d. That as a general rule, a creditor of a firm has no lien -upon the
partnership property until acquired by process of law.
3d. That upon a hearing upon bill and answer, the answer will be taken
as true in all points, and such answer cannot be contradicted except as
provided in Section 31 of Chancery Act.
4th. Where one member of a firm purchases goods or borrows money
for the firm on his own credit, giving surety for the payment of the money
or the goods, and such money or goods go into, and are used by the firm;
and the surety has to pay as such, the firm may convey the goods of the
firm to such surety in satisfaction for the money thus paid, and a creditor
of the firm cannot set aside such conveyance merely because he was, at the
time of such conveyance, a creditor of the firm.
Bill dismissed with costs, reserving any equity of complainant as to
surplus of notes and accounts.
Renry .hilips vs. The State of Ohio on the relatio of Henry H.
Harterand his wife Sarah .arter.
Writ of error to reverse the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas
of Preble county. Reserved in the District Court for decision here.
BARTLEY, J.-1. That the power of proceeding by citation or attachment against an administrator or executor for neglect to file his settlement
accounts as required by law, is a necessary incident to the proper exercise
of the jurisdiction of a probate court; and the statutory provision in the
present administration laws of the State, expressly authorizing such proceeding, is only in affirmance of that incidental power essential to enable
a probate court to control and direct the settlement of the estates of deceased persons.
2. Although such proceeding by citation or attachment against an administrator or executor, is not an action at law within the purview of the
statute of limitations, but a simple proceeding in the probate court usually
preparatory to the commencement of a suit on the administration bond,
yet lapse of time after the default of the administrator in filing his final
settlement accounts, is sufficient to bar an action on the administration
bond, or to amount to a defence against a proceeding in equity for a discovery and account, will constitute a sufficient defence against any such
proceeding by citation or attachment.
3. That although the doctrine, that a technical or direct trust is not
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barred by lapse of time, is usually recognized as true, yet it appears to be
subject to the following important qualifications, namely: That this rule
in equity is dispensed with, except in cases of fraud and concealment;
first, where there is a remedy by action at law to which a limitation is
fixed; second, where an open denial or repudiation of the trust is brought
home to the knowledge of the parties in interest, which requires them to
act as upon an asserted adverse title; third, where circumstances exist
calculated to raise a presumption from lapse of time, of a discharge or
extinguishment of the trust. Judgment of the Common Pleas reversed.
Thomas Hueston vs. The Eaton and tamilon Railroad Company.-

Error to the Common Pleas of Butler county. The opinion of the court
by
RANNEY, J.-1. The owner of land regularly appropriated to the use
of a railroad company, upon proceedings instituted by the company under
laws providing therefor, is barred of the common law remedy to sue for
and recover the damages he may have sustained by the entry of the company, and the construction of their road upon such land.
2. In such case, the bar is equally effectual, although the owner may
have refused to submit to such proceedings, or to receive the amount
awarded him, and deposited for his use.
Judgment affirmed.
Valentine Nicholson vs. Israel Pine.-In chancery from Champaign

county.

The opinion of the court by
Where a bill in chancery is filed to recover the consideration paid on a contract for the purchase of real estate after the contract of sale has been rescinded by the consent of both parties, and also
to recover the value of the corn, wheat and potatoes growing on the land
at the time of the recision of the contract, and of hay taken off the land
and in stack, and where the amount of the claim is to be reduced by the
value of the use and occupation and injuries to the premises done by the
purchasers, the respondent, after answering to the merits and submitting
his defence to the court, comes too late to object to the jurisdiction of the
court upon the ground that the complainant had a plain and adequate
remedy at law.
2. Where money is paid upon the purchase of real estate, and the contract is afterward rescinded by consent of the parties, upon an agreement
that it shall be left to the honor of the vendor to pay back such part of
the purchase money as shall be just and equitable, and he afterwards
KENNON, J.-1.
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refuses to pay any, a court will compel him to pay so much thereof as he
in justice and equity ought to have paid.
Referred to master, and remanded to District Court.
Mc Gatick vs. TPasson.-Motion for new trial-reserved by the District
Court of Cuyahoga county. The opinion of the court by
TIIURIAN, 0.J.-W. requested his hired man G. to assist him in

placing certain railroad cars and trucks-which he had sold and agreed to
ship from Cleveland to Toledo-on a vessel; to do which it was necessary
to raise them from the dock by the use of machinery and manual effort.
G. consented: the work was to be done the next day, which was Sunday,
November 15, as the vessel was about to sail, and her master would not
take the cars, &c., unless shipped on that day, and "it was a matter of
great necessity that they should be shipped as speedily as possible, as
navigation was about closing." While raising one of the trucks, a part
of the machinery gave way, owing to which, the truck fell upon G., breaking both his legs. To recover damages for this injury, he brought this
suit, charging that it was owing to W.'s neglect that the machinery'was
insufficient. A verdict being rendered for G., a new .trial was moved for
by W.

Held-

1. That if W. had no charge of, or control over the operation of shipping the cars, &e., but, on the contrary, the duty of shipping them rested
solely upon the master of the vessel, and he had the entire control over
the operation, and W. was acting merely as his assistant or servant, the
action should have been brought against the owner of the vessel and not
against W.
2. But if it was W.'s duty to ship them, or if it was the joint duty of
him and the master of the vessel, he was [as between him and G.] liable
for the injury if it resulted from his neglect, or that of the master of the
vessel, to provide suitable machinery: the defect in the machinery being
unknown to G. The general rule is, that an employer who provides the
machinery and oversees and controls its operation, must see that it is
suitable; and if an injury to the workman happen by reason of a defect,
unknown to the latter, and which the employer by the use of ordinary
care could have cured, such employer is liable for the injury.
3. Legally considered, our Sunday act is merely a civil regulation,
having no connection with religion, and founded on principles of public
policy alone. And the same policy that dictated the prohibitions it con-
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tains, also dictated its exception therefrom of "works of necessity and
charity."
4. Works of necessity, within the meaning of the act, are not limited
to labor for the preservation of life, health or property from impending
danger. The necessity may grow out of, or indeed be incident to, the
general course of trade or business, or even be an exigency of a particular
trade or business, and yet be within the exception of the act. Hence the
danger of navigation being cl6sed, may make it lawful to load a vessel on
Sunday, if there is no other time to do so.
5. The labor in the present case was a work of necessity within the
meaning of the statute, and consequently the point of defence, that the
plaintiff was injured while in the commission of an unlawful act, cannot
be maintained.
6. A mere difference of opinion between the court and jury does not
warrant the former in setting aside the finding of the latter. That would
be, in effect, to abolish the institution of juries and substitute the court
to try all questions of fact. It must be clear that the jury has erred, before a new trial will be granted on the ground that the verdict is against
the weight of evidence, or unsupported by it. And if this is the rule, as
it undoubtedly is, even in the court where a cause is tried, and before
whom the witnesses appeared and testified, a fortiori, ought it to be the
rule when another court decides the motion for a new trial, with no other
knowledge of the facts than is derived through the imperfect medium of a
written statement.
Motion overruled and judgment upon the verdict.
BARTLEY, J., dissented, upon the ground that the verdict was against
the weight of the evidence.
ieTown Council of the Town of NDewarke vs. Brady, Elliott, et. al.Action of debt on penal bond; reserved by the District Court of Licking
county.

By an act of the Legislature of 1849, the Town Council of the town of
Newark was authorized to subscribe to the stock of the Newark Plank
Road Company not more than $10,000, and to issue bonds in payment of
the stock, payable at such times, not exceeding ten years, and for such
amounts as the council might determine, bearing interest, payable annually, at the rate of seven per cent. per annum; and the Town Council was
authorized to sell and transfer the stock so soon as it could be sold at par.
The opinion of the court by
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KENNON, J.-i. That the par value of the stock is an 4mount equal to
the amount of stock subscribed.
2. That a sale of such stock, by which the purchaser is bound to pay
the bond of $10,000 and interest, given by the town of Newark for the
$10,000 stock, is a sale of such stock at its par value.
3. That when there is no restraining clause in the charter of a corporation, it may dispose of any property which it has the right to acquire.
4. That the Town Council of the town of Newark are restrained from
selling the plank road stock for less than the par value, but it may sell
the stock oi credit, provided the sales amount to the par value of the
stock.
5. Where a corporation issues its own bonds, payable at a future day,
with seven per cent. interest thereon, payable semi-annually, when by law
it was authorized to make the interest payable annually only, the person
who contracts with the corporation for a valuable consideration to redeem
such bonds, cannot avoid his contract upon the ground that the corporation exceeded its authority in making the interest on such bonds payable
semi-annually instead of annually.
6. If the object of the purchaser of this stock was to obtain the control of the stock of the Plank Road Company, and thereby improperly use
the provisions of the charter of the Plank Road Company for the purpose
of issuing and putting in circulation, as money and currency, the notes of
the company, payable to bearer in violation of law, and such fact at the
time of sale was known to the Town Council of the town of Newark, and
it made the sale for the purpose of enabling the purchaser to carry out
such illegal purpose, and the purchaser was, by such sale, enabled more
effectually to carry out his intention, and he did in fact do so, the sale of
the stock was illegal and void.
The demurrers to all the pleas of Elliott are sustained, and also to all
the pleas of Brady except the 9th, as to which the demurrer is overruled
and the cause remanded to the District Court for further proceeding.
In ti e matter of Sarah Sinclair's will. In error from Monroe
county.
SwAN, J.-That a will lost or spoliated or destroyed before the decease
of the testator, cannot be established.

